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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ELLIS R. BLACKWELL, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. 900262-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear the above-entitled appeal is conferred 
upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 77-35-26 (2) (a) (1987), and also pursuant to Rule 3(a) 
of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-2a-3 (f) (1989), because the appeal is from a District 
Court in a criminal matter involving a Third Degree Felony. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the final order of the District 
Court, Judge Ronald 0. Hyde presiding, denying Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress Evidence dated the 27th day of February, 
1990. 
DATE OF DECISION 
Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of pos-
session of a controlled substance, a Third Degree Felony, on the 
13th day of April, 1990, reserving at the time of plea the right 
to appeal the decision of the Court relative to Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress Evidence. Defendant was sentenced to serve a 
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term not to exceed five years at the Utah State Prison. He was 
granted credit for time served. 
STATEMENT OF,THE ISSUES PRESENTED ,0N APPEAL 
WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF A 
URINALYSIS TEST SUBMITTED TO BY REASON OF A PAROLE 
AGREEMENT CAN BE USED AS EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE A 
NEW AND INDEPENDENT CHARGE. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant, Ellis R. Blackwell, was paroled by the Board 
of Pardons of the State of Utah and signed an agreement setting 
forth the conditions of that parole on the 19th day of June, 
1989. One of the special conditions included in the parole 
agreement was the agreement by Defendant to submit to random 
urinalysis. On December 7, 1989, at approximately 12:45 p.m., 
Agent Jerry W. Summers saw the Defendant at Stimpson's Market. 
Agent Summers reported that the Defendant attempted to flee from 
him and that he gave chase, ultimately resulting in Defendant's 
apprehension and being taken into custody. The Defendant was 
transported to the Weber County jail and booked as a parole 
violator. The Defendant submitted to a urinalysis at the jail. 
He was advised by a parole agent that the urinalysis was a 
condition of his parole. Mike Sargent told the Defendant that 
all he wanted the urinalysis for was a comparision with a prior 
test. The urinalysis test came back positive for illicit drugs. 
The Defendant was charged with, among other things, possession 
of a controlled substance, a Third Degree Felony, on or about 
the 13th day of December, 1989. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
It is the Defendant's position that the results of a 
urinalysis test submitted to by reason of the provisions of a 
parole agreement and taken while in custody should have been 
suppressed so far as its use in the prosecution of a new and 
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independant charge for possession of a controlled substance is 
concerned. 
ARGUMENT 
Section 77-27-3, UCA (1953) as amended, grants to the 
parole board alone the authority to impose conditions of parole. 
Those conditions must bear a reasonable relation to the crime 
for which the Defendant is being paroled and to the goal of 
rehabilitation. The logical extention of the language set forth 
in Section 77-27-3 would limit the use of evidence obtained as a 
result of the implementation of those parole conditions to those 
areas wherein the parole board and the parolee agreed to be 
impacted. The parole agreement in question specifically states 
that violation of the agreement, and/or any conditions thereof, 
or (emphasis added) any new conviction for a crime, may result in 
action by the board causing parole to be revoked or the parole 
period to begin anew. The agreement itself implies that the 
conditions are imposed to insure compliance with the parole. 
Evidence obtained by reason of a warrantless search and as a 
result of self-incriminating urinalysis should properly be 
limited so as to impact the Defendant's prior sentence only. To 
hold otherwise is to say that a parolee really has no 4th or 5th 
Amendment rights as guaranteed by both State and Federal Consti-
tutions. 
Parolees definitely have 4th and 5th Amendment rights. The 
liberty of a parolee includes many of the core values of unqua-
lified liberty and and a parolee has a right to enjoy a signi-
ficant degree of privacy. State v. Fields, 686 P.2d 1379 
(Hawaii, 1984). In the above case, the Hawaii court also said a 
consent search obtained in an inherently coercive situation is 
not a lawful consent. In the instant case the search of the 
Defendant and his bodyfluids was required by his parole agree-
ment. Defendant either consented to the test or his parole 
could be violated and Defendant's parole revoked. Such a 
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condition is inherently coercive at least as far as it's use to 
substantiate a new charge is concerned. 
The Defendant does not allege that the search pursuant to 
the parole agreement is invalid for all purposes. Defendant 
alleges that the search is improper only for purposes exceeding 
the scope of the agreement. The State seeks to justify a 
warrantless search and seizure on the basis that it was consented 
to by the Defendant in his parole agreement. To that proposition 
Defendant takes no offense. It is where the State seeks to use 
that same evidence to substantiate an entirely independant crime 
that we object and assert that constitutionally guaranteed 
freedoms are being trampled on. 
There is no question that self-incriminating statements 
made during a custodial interrogation wherein evidence is being 
sought upon which to base new charges must conform to the 
requirements of Miranda v. Arizona^ 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
Defendant asserts that to the extent that the evidence obtained 
is being used to support new charges, the requirements in Miranda 
and the 4th and 5th Amendments apply. There is a difference 
between evidence obtained by reason of an agreement which is a 
condition of parole being used as grounds to violate one's 
parole and using the evidence so obtained to maintain a separate 
criminal offense. 
Parolees may be required to provide incriminating evidence 
by correction officials for legitimate correction interest. 
State y. Fogartyy 610 P.2d 140. But this case, which involved a 
clause in a probation agreement which allowed any law enforcement 
officer to conduct a warrantless search of the Defendant's 
person, residence, or vehicle at anytime, stands for the proposi-
tion that such a provision is too broad. The Court in this case 
stated that the purpose of the search must be related to the 
Defendant's prior conviction or rehabilitation. The Court 
implied that such provisions are not valid for use to facilitate 
future investigation of crimes. 
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In State v. .Wilson, 521 P.2d 1317 (Oregon, 1974), a convict-
ed Defendant objected to a probation provision requiring her to 
submit to a polygraph examination every ninety days. The Court 
said, "The results of the examination can be used as evidence in 
further proceedings in this case and in the determination of the 
Defendant's probationary status; however, the results cannot be 
used in any other case without Defendant's consent". Parole 
revocation hearings are not considered criminal proceedings and 
therefore do not trigger 4th and 5th Amendment rights. State v. 
Age, 590 P. 2d 759 (Oregon, 1979). This case held that a condi-
tion requiring a probationer to submit to polygraph tests did 
not violate 5th Amendment rights. However, the Court further 
said that such a requirement would be improper if the district 
attorney had power to make such a request. Clearly the impli-
cation is that a distinction is drawn between use of evidence 
obtained as a result of a probation agreement as it relates to 
the Defendant's probation and its use as evidence in an inde-
pendant criminal action. 
The Court in State y. ,Evans, 252 N.W.2d (Wise. 1977) recog-
nized the distinction which the Defendant asserts is applicable 
to this case. In this case the Defendant refused to account for 
his whereabouts as required by his probation agreement, invoking 
his 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and his 
probation was revoked as a result. The court said, 
We resolve this issue by holding that statements or 
the fruits of statements made by a probationer to his 
probation agency or in a probation revocation hearing 
in response to questions which as here, are the result 
of pending charges or accusations of particular 
criminal activity, may not be used to incriminate the 
probationer in a subsequent criminal proceeding. We 
reaffirm past decisions holding that a probationer's 
refusal to account for his whereabouts and activities 
is a serious violation of probation conditions which 
may merit revocation. 
In Evans, supra, the Defendant was not made aware that any 
statements he made could not be used against him in subsequent 
criminal proceedings. As a result, the court reversed and 
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remanded the case. In the instant case, the Defendant was told 
specifically that submitting to the urinalysis test could not be 
used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Never-
theless , this is exactly what the State has done. 
The State relied on two cases to support its position at 
the suppression hearing. The first was Minnesota v. Murphy, 
104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984). In that case a Defendant 
sought to suppress testimony concerning his confession made 
during a meeting with his probation officer with whom he was 
required to meet as a condition of his probation following his 
conviction on an earlier, and separate charge. The Minnesota 
Court ruled that the confession was admissible because the 
Defendant was not "in custody" at the time of the statement and 
the confession was neither compelled nor involuntary. The 
Minnesota Court discussed the question of compulsion as it 
relates to statements by a probationer to his probation officer. 
The Court, quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 38 
L.Ed.2d 274, 94 S.Ct. 316 (1973), stated, "A Defendant does not 
lose this protection (referring to his 5th Amendment rights) by 
reason of his conviction of a crime; not withstanding that the 
Defendant is imprisoned or on probation at the time he makes 
incriminating statements, if those statements are compelled they 
are inadmissible in a subsequent trial for a crime other than 
that for which he has been convicted". The appellant contends 
that the urinalysis test taken while the Defendant was in 
custody and pursuant to a parole agreement results in the 
Defendant being compelled to incriminate himself within the 
meaning of the 5th Amendment. The Minnesota Court convincingly 
states the reason why the urinalysis test in the instant case 
should not be admissible against the Defendant upon a new and 
independant charge when it says, "A State may require a proba-
tioner to appear and discuss matters that affect his probationary 
status; such a requirement, without more, does not give rise to 
a self-executing privilege. The result may be different if the 
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questions put to the probationer however relevant to his 
probationary status, call for answers that would incriminate him 
in a pending or later criminal prosecution. There is thus a 
substantial basis in our cases for concluding that if the State, 
either expressly or by implicationf asserts that invocation of 
the privilege would lead to revocation of probation, it would 
have created the classic penalty situation, the failure to 
assert the privilege would be excused, and the probationer's 
answer would be deemed compelled and inadmissible in a criminal 
prosecution". In a separate opinion written by Justice Marshall 
and joined by Justice Stevens and Justice Brennen, again citing 
Lefkowitz v. Turley, supra, it is stated that "a probationer 
retains the privilege enjoyed by all citizens to refuse, 'to 
answer offical questions put to him in any ...proceeding, civil 
or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incrimi-
nate him in future criminal proceedings'". The separate opinion 
goes on to state, "If a truthful response might reveal that he 
has violated a condition of his probation but would not subject 
him to criminal prosecution, the State may insist that he 
respond and may penalize him for refusing to do so. By contrast, 
if there is a chance that a truthful answer to a given question 
would expose the probationer to liability for a crime different 
from the crime for which he has already been convicted, he has a 
right to refuse to answer and the State may not attempt to 
coerce him to forgo that right. As the majority points out, if 
the answer to a question might lead both to criminal sanctions 
and to a probation revocation, the State has the option of 
insisting that the probationer respond, in return for an express 
guarantee of immunity from criminal liability". 
The State also relied on the case of State of Utah v. 
Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254 (Utah, 1983) to support its position. 
The Velasquez case however, can be distinguished from the 
instant case in that in Velasquez, agents seized evidence 
discovered pursuant to a warrant which was undertaken after a 
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determination that the parolee was in violation of his parole 
agreement. The evidence supporting the conviction of the 
Defendant there was not the same evidence which justified the 
intrusion into, or the denial of, his constitutional rights. It 
was not the identical evidence which supported the parole 
violation. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant asserts that as a parolee, he is entitled to the 
same constitutional rights as other citizens except, and to the 
extent that those rights are altered by the terms of the parole 
agreement. The parole agreement and the interest of the Board of 
Pardons require that an alleged violation based upon evidence 
obtained as the result fo urinalysis test submitted to because 
of that parole agreement requirement be limit€>d in its effect 
to the charges for which the parolee is paroled. To allow the 
evidence so obtained to form the basis of an entirely new 
criminal charge or charges makes the parole agents investigations 
an exercise of a police function not intended by the statutory 
mandate granted to the parole board by Section 77-27-3, UCA 
(1953) as amended. Evidence so obtained is clearly the result 
of compulsory situation. The results of the urinalysis test 
submitted to by reason of the Dfednants parole agreement while 
in custody should have been suppressed so far as its use in the 
pending criminal charge or possession of a controlled substance 
is concerned, and Defendant respectfully request that this 
Court reverse his conviction.
 u 
Respectfully submitted this __J^____day of August, 1990. 
STEPHEN A. LAKI 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the z1! day of August, 19 90, I 
mailed four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant, postage prepaid to Paul Van Dam, Attorney General, 236 
State Capitol Bldg., Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
STEPHEN A. LAKER' 
Attorney for Defendant 
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ADDENDUM 
Parole Agreement 
Ruling on A Motion to Suppress Evidence 
MEMBERS 
PAUL W B0YD6N 
VICTORIA J. PALACIOS 
GARY L WEBSTER 
PAUL W SHEFFIELD 
Administrate* 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAROLE AGREEMENT 
I, ELLIS RAY BLACKWELL, agree to be directed and supervised by Agents of the Utah State 
Department of Corrections and be accountable for my actions and conduct to Utah State 
Corrections, according to tiiis Agreement. 
I furcner agree to abide by all conditions of parole as set forth in this Agreement and any 
additional conditions as set forth by the Utah State Board of Pardons, consistent with the 
laws of tne State of Utan. I fully understand that the violation of this Agreement and/or any 
conditions thereof or any new conviction for a crime may result in action by the Board causing 
my parole to be revoked or my parole period to start over. 
CONDITIONS OF PAROLE 
1. 
2. 
RELEASE: 
RESIDENCE: 
3. 
4. 
CONDUCT: 
REPORT: 
EMPLOYMENT: 
On the day of my,release from the institution or confinement. I will 
report to my assigned Parole Agent, unless otherwise approved in writing. 
I shall establish and reside at a residency of record and shall report such 
residence or any change thereof to my Parole Agent. I shall not leave the 
State of Utah witnout prior written authorization from rav Parole Agent. It 
is hereby acknowledged that should I leave the State of Utah without written 
authorization from my Parole Agent, that I hereby waive extradition from anv 
state in which I may be found, to che State of Utah. 
I snail obey all State and Federal laws and municipal ordinances at all 
times. 
Ijshall make written or in person reports to mv Parole Agent *?y the fifth 
as directed and I shall permit visits to my place 
e§ideuce#as r e r " — • *— — ™ — 1 - A—*- r— ^ -r ' -••-
compliance with th 
of each and every month or k
of r equired by my Parole Agent for the*purpose of insuring 
-*-*-- conditions of parole. 
I will seetc and maintain full-time 
an educational or therapy program a] employment unless I am participating in pproved by my Parole Agent. 
I agree to allotf a Parole Agent to search my person, residence, vehicle, 
or any other property under my control, without a warrant, anv time day or 
nigat, upon reasonable suspicion as ascertained by a Parole Agent, to insure 
compliance with the conditions of my parole. 
I shall not own, possess, or liave under my control any explosives. 
firearms, or any dangerous weapons as defined in Utah Code Annotated, 
Section /6-10-501, as amended. 
I shall not associate with any known criminal in any manner which can 
reasonably be expected to result in, or which has resulted in criminal or 
illegal activity. 
SPECIAL CONDITIONS: I shall: 
1. Pay restitution of $399.75. 2. Submit to random urinalysis. 
3. Successfully complete Substance Abuse Therapy. jy^.L^z**' <L% •. "* "*"• 
4. Not consume or possess any alconol. 5. Successfully complete ISP Program. 
Amended 5/15/1989 
SEARCH: 
7. WEAPONS 
8. ASSOCIATION: 
I nave read, unders 
a copy of this 
WITNESSED BY: 
TITLE: 
d and agree to the above conditions and I hereby acknowledge receipt of 
AJ^LLWOV this A? dav o f ^ 0 /<j day o f < ^ H J A J ^ 19 S3-
SIGNED : frO- /? ^^^C^t^, 
Parolee 
ADDRESS: /<*? ^ / ±e? <k_ 
j£ ^U^v^^^r' &#*£* J^C. 
Administrator, Board of Pardons 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 1 
T RULING ON A MOTION TO 
Plaintiff, SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
vs. 1 
ELLIS R. BLACKWELL, Case NO. 891920157 
Defendant. T 
Having read the briefs and cases submitted, I hold that 
evidence obtained as a result of a urinalysis test submitted to 
by reason of a parole agreement can be used as evidence to 
substantiate a new and independent charge. 
Motion to suppress evidence is denied. 
DATED this <^7 day of February, 1990. 
